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how rarely the issue of neutrality has received any comment at all.[4] Yet a considerable measure of
the dialogue's force arises from the confrontation between the Melians' insistence on the validity of
their neutral status within the framework of recognized diplomatic customs and the Athenians' equally
forceful insistence that such rules without the power of enforcement are nothing more than
meaningless illusions seductively creating false hopes among the weak but incapable of engendering
restraint on the part of the strong.
It is important to remember that Melos was not a subject state in revolt but a nonaligned neutral
whose position, as far as we know, had not been challenged by the Athenians prior to the
Peloponnesian War (see 5.3.B above). Unfortunately for Melos, the outbreak of war in 431 brought a
change in the Athenian attitude; and it is the evolution in the Athenian position that Thucydides
illuminates by focusing on the suppression of this
[3]
[4] For example, it received no comment in the recent discussions of P. Pouncey, The Necessities of
War: A Study of Thucydides' Pessimism (New York, 1980), 83-104, and Connor, Thucydides , 147-57;
others, like Andrewes, HCT , vol. 3, 157, sidestep the issue. Andrewes remarks "On balance it seems
unlikely that the attack of 416 was due solely to an Athenian whim, without any antecedent quarrel."
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stubborn, but harmless, neutral state. The echoes of the earlier extensive treatment of the issue of
Plataean neutrality are obvious and no doubt intentional, as is the easily recognizable foreshadowing of
the important role of neutrality during the subsequent expedition to Sicily.[5]
But for Thucydides it was surely neither the Melians themselves nor their hoped-for status that
were of critical interest but rather the implications and meaning of Athens' subjugation of Melos; for in
the rhetoric that the Athenians use to justify their actions there emerges a new language of diplomacy
and a new conception of interstate relations. The dialogue provides a nearly natural context in which
this can largely be accomplished by comparison of the speakers' words. Thucydides thus sets in
juxtaposition traditional, customary rules of interstate behavior, which balanced rights and obligations
to the benefit of weak and powerful alike, and the newly evolved ethos of hegemonial, imperial Greek
states that refused to accept any restraints on the pursuit of self-interest. It is only with the perfect
vision of hindsight that we see in Athens' disastrous defeat in Sicily and final loss of the war how the
dramatized confrontation over Melian neutrality reveals a tragic and fatal flaw in the Athenian position.
In the end, it becomes clear that with the determined suppression of Melos the once intelligent and
confident imperial state has begun to lose control of itself and can no longer differentiate between
necessary precautions for security and destructive misuses of power.
II. The City-States of Southern Italy (415-413)
Athens' great military campaign in Sicily once again brings the posture and activities of uncommitted
states to the attention of our sources. Despite traditional ties of ethnic kinship and existing economic,
political, and diplomatic connections that encouraged active participation, the West Greeks proved to
be surprisingly cautious about taking sides.[6] When Athens sent an unprecedented
[5] See 6.4 above and 7.2-3 below. Connor, Thucydides , 147-57, provides an insightful analysis of
these echoes and foreshadowing but fails to comment on the underlying importance of the issue of
neutrality to all these passages.
[6] On the racial alignment, see Thuc. 3. 86.2-4; 4. 61.4; 6. 6.2, 44.3, 76.2, 80.3; 7. 57-58; on
economic ties, 3. 86.4; 6. 88.9; on political commitments before the war, 3. 86.3 (the
Leontine-Athenian treaty of 433/432 [I G I , 50=Meiggs and Lewis, no. 64; Bengtson, SVA no. 163]);
see also the Rhegian-Athenian treaty of 433/432 (IG I , 51=Meiggs and Lewis, no. 63; Bengtson, SVA
no. 162) and the Egestaean-Athenian treaty of disputed date (ranging from 458/457 to 418/417; I G I
, 19-20.1.2=Meiggs and Lewis, no. 37; Bengtson, SVA no. 139). On Athenian policy toward the West
prior to the Peloponnesian War (an interest reflected in Thuc. 1. 36.2), see T. E. Wick, "Athens' [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
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