Aurel Braun NATO Russia Relations in the Twenty First Century (2008)

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earth. Having been subjected to a brutal terrorist attack on innocent civilians at this
critical point in its national history left the United States a more intense and less
predictable international actor. How the United States decides to use its power and
influence will have a major impact on the future of the Alliance that it still leads.
Will it continue to act with a degree of unilateralism and paranoia that irritates and
88 S.R. Sloan
alienates even its best allies, or will it find a way to be a confident and effective
benign hegemon? The bottom line is that, for the Alliance to recover from its
recent crisis, the United States will have to find ways to balance the advantages of
multilateral cooperation and burden sharing against the temptations and attractions
of unilateralism.
How the hegemon s allies react to US leadership is also important. Most
European nations appear prepared to follow a benign US hegemon on most major
issues. Will the incredible power and capabilities of the United States convince the
allies to follow, even when the United States leads with a clumsy hand? Or will the
allies revolt, periodically, individually or as a group, in response to heavy-handed
US unilateralism? In terms of capabilities, will the allies respond to US leadership
by creating the capabilities required to make serious military contributions to global
military operations? Will they decide to take the easy road of concentrating on
their soft-power resources and allow the United States to take most responsibility
for military capabilities? Or will they build up significant European military
capabilities intended to give Europe more leverage over US decisions? If the EU s
European Security and Defense Policy is to be taken seriously in Washington,
the EU members will have to demonstrate that the new aspect of the unification
process adds capabilities to the transatlantic inventory of security tools, not just
institutions and acronyms.
At the national level, for Europe to play its part in reconstructing a positive
transatlantic dynamic, Germany will be required to find a new balance in its policies
that serves two old masters Europeanism and Atlanticism while responding
to its rediscovered, redefined and reenergized sense of national interests. France
will have to give more weight to the transatlantic dimension of its interests. Great
Britain will be required to be a good European while remaining Washington s
trusted partner.
Finally, the fall 2005 rioting in France has illustrated that the problems of
ethnic peace and justice are not just international, but exist inside many allied
nations. It would be easy for the United States to respond to persistent French
criticism of social and economic injustice in the United States by thumbing its
nose at the challenges to French society and government. The better approach, of
course, will be for all the allies the United States, Canada and the Europeans
to work together to find ways to ensure that the external threats posed by Islamic
fundamentalism are not internalized because of the shortcomings of our socio-
economic systems.
The attitudes and capabilities the United States and Europe bring to the NATO
table in the years immediately ahead will determine whether the Alliance will
become part of the answer to problems of global stability. If NATO meaning,
of course, the NATO nations successfully manages the stabilization effort in
Afghanistan, it will establish its credentials as a serious and constructive device
for multilateral security cooperation for the international community. Of course,
failure in any mission the members assign to the Alliance could have disastrous
consequences for NATO s credibility and future utility.
At the end of the day, there are two basic requirements for NATO to be perceived
NATO beyond Russia 89
as important enough for the member states to ensure its survival. Put most simply,
the United States must be convinced that political and military cooperation with
the European allies makes an important net contribution to US interests. On the
other side of the coin, the Europeans must believe that contributing to international
security efforts alongside the United States will produce influence for Europe over
US decisions that affect their security. These are the fundamental self-interested
terms for continuation of a vital, productive transatlantic bargain that has moved
beyond Russia.
Notes
1 NATO, Study on NATO Enlargement (Brussels: September 1995).
2 This discussion draws on the author s role as a consultant to the Senate NATO Observer
Group throughout the enlargement process, including presence on the floor of the Senate
during the debate on the resolution of ratification. A more detailed version appears
in: Stanley R. Sloan, NATO, the European Union and the Atlantic Community: The
Transatlantic Bargain Challenged (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005),
156 66.
3 US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, The Debate on NATO Enlargement, 105th
Congress, 1st session, 7, 9, 22, 28 and 30 October and 5 November 1997, S. Hrg.
105 285, 2.
4 Sean Kay, What Went Wrong with NATO? , Cambridge Review of International
Affairs, Vol. 18, No. 1, April 2005.
5 George F. Kennan, A Fateful Error, New York Times, 5 February 1997, A23.
6 Following one Senate NATO Observer Group session in the weeks before the Senate
vote, the late Paul Wellstone engaged me in a discussion of the Russia issue. I attempted
to provide a balanced perspective, but suggested that Kennan s prediction was probably
exaggerated. It was clear from that discussion, however, that Wellstone s vote probably
would be with the treaty opponents.
7 Mike Peacock, Blair Pushes for a New NATO/Russia Relationship, Reuters, 16
November 2001.
8 Michael Wines, Russia Could Get Veto Power in New NATO, International Herald
Tribune, 23 November 2001, 1.
9 Ronald D. Asmus and Jeremy D. Rosner, Don t Give Russia a Veto, Washington
Times, 5 December 2001, A19.
10 Lord Robertson, NATO in the 21st Century, Speech at Charles University, Prague,
21 March 2002 (full text on NATO web site at http://www.nato.int/).
11 Claire Bigg, Russia: Putin Satisfied as G-8 Summit Winds to a Close, RFE/RL
report, 17 July 2006.
12 Kay, 86.
13 Ivo Daalder and James Goldgeier, Global NATO, Foreign Affairs, September
October 2006, p. 109.
14 Christopher Marquis, General Urges NATO to Send Afghanistan More Troops (New
York Times, 28 January 2004).
90 S.R. Sloan
15 Mary Elise Sarotte, German Military Reform and European Security, Adelphi Paper
340, The International Institute for Strategic Studies (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2001), pp. 9 12.
16 Klaus Naumann, Assessing NATO s Chances to Succeed (World Security Network,
30 January 2004).
17 US Congress, Congressional Record Senate, 8 May 2003, S5882.
18 Kay, 84.
19 Leo G. Michel, NATO Decisionmaking: Au Revoir to Consensus? (National Defense
University, US National Defense University Strategic Forum, No. 202, August 2003).
http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/SF202/SF202.pdf [Accessed 11 November 2005].
20 Discussions of the division of labor issue with Robert P. Grant greatly contributed to the
development of this analysis. Division of tasks makes sense in terms of the most effective
use of US and European capabilities, but the danger that divided responsibilities will
lead to divergent perspectives is real. Something like a shared continuum approach to
future conflicts, with the United States and the European allies involved along the full
spectrum but with roles attuned to specific capabilities and resources, will be necessary
to overcome the dilemma posed by the division of labor issue. [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]

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